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the Line:
Holding Agency Counsel
to Professional Standards

rWalking

by Robert C. Fellmeth*

"what kind of client control do you
he phrase
"client
control"-as
in
have
to settle
this?"-is
familiar to
litigators. Although the expression sounds
patronizing, there are times when a client
insists on doing what is stupid, wrong, or
unlawful. At these times, counsel's ability
to influence the client becomes important.
When a client does not listen, counsel
must often choose whether to help pilot
the wayward ship to lessen anticipated
damage, or row ashore and leave the vessel to its perilous fate.
Sometimes, lack of client control requires counsel to leave the boat forthwith,
e.g., plans to commit criminal acts, demands that spurious lawsuits be filed, positions taken, courts misled, or the legal
process otherwise abused. California's
Rules of Professional Conduct command
the withdrawal of counsel where a client is
litigating without probable cause, or where
continued employment will result in a vio1
lation of the rules or the State Bar Act.
In turn, the State Bar Act's "duties of
an attorney" include "to counsel or maintain such actions, proceedings, or defenses
only as appear to him or her legal or just
'2
(except in defense of accused criminals).
And another enumerated duty is "to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to him or her such means
only as are consistent with truth, and never
to seek to mislead the judge...by an3 artifice
or false statement of fact or law."
Beyond mandatory withdrawal, counsel may withdraw where a client seeks to
pursue an unlawful course of action, insists upon making a claim or argument
that is "not warranted," or even acts contrary to the advice of counsel (even if
not
4
prohibited by the rules or the Act).
Arguably, an attorney advising an
agency has a heightened obligation. First,
agency counsel has duties flowing from
Rule of Professional Conduct 3-600 gov-

erning representation of an "organization."
The organization itself-not factions of
it-is the client. Where the organization
seeks to violate the law, the rule spells out
duties to seek reconsideration, to appeal
the matter to higher authority within the
entity, and finally to resign "in accordance
with rule 3-700."
There are other reasons why an agency's counsel may have special obligations.
Groups do not necessarily exercise more
prudent judgment than do individuals. Far
from moderating excesses, group dynamics
can often stimulate excesses-whether a
gang, nation, political party, trade association, or other assemblage. Our species is
particularly dangerous in groups.
The danger of abuse by an agency exceeds other human groupings because it
wields state police powers. Most agencies
have the authority to determine who may
practice, or continue to practice, the trade
or profession which may be the life goal
of an individual.
Adding further to the obligation is the
nature of the agency-advising counsel.
They generally are not private attorneys
who depend upon the attraction and retention of clients, but are public employees
paid a salary, usually from an office of
county counsel or city attorney for major
local jurisdictions. At the state level, the
37 agencies within the Department of Consumer Affairs are advised by the Department's hired attorneys, and these agencies (and most others) are also advised by
attorneys from the Attorney's General's
Office.
The Attorney General's Office is certainly the repository of the highest obligation to comply with the standards of
the Rules of Professional Conduct and
the State Bar Act. Deputy attorneys general do not solely represent public agencies; they advise them on behalf of the
People of the State, as officers of the State.
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However, in the past twenty years, the
Attorney General's Office has publicly
withdrawn as an agency's counsel in only
four known situations, most of which involved a political or policy-related objection of the Attorney General personally.
Critics of state and local agencies are
often bewildered by the failure of counsel to "just say no" to agencies insisting
on violations of law. Critics contend that
violative behavior, while not prevalent,
is also not rare.
Since 1987, the Office of Administrative Law has reviewed 104 complaints of
alleged "underground rulemaking," allegations that a state agency unlawfully adopted a "rule" without legally required due
process, including notice, an opportunity
for public comment, hearing, review for
necessity, clarity, authority, etc., or even
publication in the California Code of Regulations. It has determined that 87 were unlawfully created. 5 Where was counsel?
Certainly a substantial number of agency decisions are close questions. But where
the agency is moving against clear legislative intent and/or common decency, what
should counsel do? How often has agency
counsel advised against the commission of
an unlawful or improper act? How often
has counsel resigned from further representation of an agency under Rule 3-700 as a
result of a failure to follow proper advice?
In 1986, the Center for Public Interest
Law was approached by 32 Vietnamese
physicians who had emigrated to California and had been denied licenses by the
Medical Board, although they had passed
all examinations and completed all postgraduate training requirements. An investigation disclosed that the agency had met
unlawfully in private, and decided to suspend the licensing of Vietnamese physicians without explaining why and without
justification. Two years of devastating career interruption, deceit from agency officials, and bureaucratic stonewalling ensued
before licenses were finally issued.Y Where
was agency counsel during the process?
For years, the Board of Accountancy
has been permitting a committee of private
practitioners to decide disciplinary cases
against colleagues and competitors. A
challenge to this practice, which is obviously unlawful, 7 yielded defensiveness
from the Board and indifference from its
counsel. Why have counsel from both the
Department of Consumer Affairs and the
Attorney General's Office been advising
the agency consistent with its ambitions,
but contrary to basic legal principles?
Some state boards decided that the
Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act should
have a loophole allowing committees to
meet privately so long as they consist of
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"less than a quorum" of the board. In fact,
the Act very clearly states and intends that
a board committee of more than two members must meet in public. However, the Attorney General wrote informal opinion letters supporting the boards' position at the
urging of agency clients, managed to get
part of one such letter into a court's dicta
(in an inapplicable case interpreting a different statute), and then cited that dicta as
a holding in subsequent litigation. 8 Here,
deputy attorneys general self-created a
basis to undermine one of California's
"sunshine" statutes-until an appellate
court called them on it and noted that it
would 9 "decline...to join this circle of
error."
In these cases, and in others, there has
been a failure to comply with the Rules of
Professional Conduct and a failure of accountability. Few if any attorneys have
ever been fined, sanctioned, demoted, or
even publicly criticized for advising an
agency to go ahead with an unlawful or
unfair act. Needless to say, none has ever
been sanctioned for failing to resign under
the obligation of Rule 3-700(B).
One dynamic that may be at the heart
of the failure to understand the proper role
of public counsel to an agency is the "hired
gun," "adversarial process" training received by attorneys in law school and replicated to excess in civil litigation. Schooled in the relativism of the Socratic method
(there is no perfect answer; all have flaws),
attorneys are taught that law is a game of
one flawed argument juxtaposed against
another flawed argument, and that both
sides advocate to a neutral third partywho alone has the responsibility to find the
correct answer.
Add to this mentality a desire to win
the approval of the group one is advising, and you have a recipe for the classic
"enabler"--decried by critics as the current norm in public agency representation. The "enabler" does not look with
neutrality at the statutes which may be
implicated in an agency action, does not
attempt to ascertain the legislative intent
at issue, is rarely tuned to concepts of
fairness for outsiders. Instead, he or she
views the agency client as seeking an end
the agency determines; counsel's role is
to use legal skills to help the agency
achieve that end. Such a goal involves
reading statutes contrary to legislative
intent, finding loopholes, making supportive arguments-in essence, serving
the agency by helping it do whatever it
wants to do. Where advice is not followed,
counsel nevertheless remains loyal, attempts to mitigate harm, and publicly defends the agency's position, using every
argument and artifice available.

Many attorneys who advise agencies
have a problem walking the line between
a properly subsidiary role to serve a client
and informing the agency when its plans
breach larger obligations the agency must
follow. Counsel must attempt to consider
the agency's plans apart from the agency,
its territory, and its ambitions, and look at
what it is doing in light of legitimate competing policies and laws.
One way to do this is to make the argument from the opposite side. If, looking
at the situation from the viewpoint of another legitimate interest, the direction undertaken is unlawful or simply abusive of
higher values, the agency should be so advised. If the actions are unlawful and the
advice is ignored, counsel must withdraw.
This can be done politely, deferentially, or
regretfully, but-regardless of its historical
rarity-counsel is obligated to withdraw. If
the action is lawful and not subject to mandatory withdrawal, but abusive of other
higher values, counsel should consider
withdrawal under the permissive provision of the rules.
Once a decision has been made to withdraw, there is a duty to mitigate harm that
may occur from counsel's departure. Turning over files to alternate counsel, meeting
approaching deadlines, and maintaining
client confidences may be involved. Even
here there may be limitations on assistance
when the agency is pursuing an unlawful
path. And it is proper to notify substitute
counsel of the reason for withdrawal, enabling him or her to make a similar conscientious decision.
The Rules of Professional Conduct and
the State Bar Act do not define lawyers as
a profession of hired guns. The adversary
process serves the higher end of truth-seeking; it is not the end itself. And the adversary process is-in particular-not an absolute shelter for public counsel who represent interests beyond the agency client.
Members of the State Bar are understandably defensive about the negative
public image of attorneys. We do not understand how we are so condemned when
all we are doing is professionally serving
our clients. Critics argue, with some persuasive force, that we will be thought of
more positively when we internalize a
more sophisticated hierarchy of values, one
placing compliance with the law, civility,
and human kindness on a footing a step
above the adversary game we have exaggerated into a self-caricature. Certainly the
attorneys in a position to begin such a renaissance are those advising agencies:
Their clients are capable of much damage
if operating outside the law's bonafide intent. These attomeys are in a position to
take a stand without serious individual
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sacrifice, and they have clear obligations
even as counsel beyond their facial client-to the taxpayers and the body politic who create their position, pay them,
and trust them to represent more than the
territorial proclivities of an agency.
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